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CHAPTER I
THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM AND ITS
UTILIZATION OF MONETARY CONTROL MECHANISMS
The Federal Reserve System was created under the Federal
Reserve Act of 1913 to execute monetary policy.

Monetary policy

’’attempts to provide the public with the cash balances and bank
credit necessary to sustain growth in output at high levels
of employment and to maintain a stable purchasing power for the
dollar."^The Federal Reserve Board, in its execution of mon
etary policy, utilizes various mechanisms in affecting money,
with the use of the discount rate as a regulator of the cost
and availability of funds or credit.

The Federal Reserve

Board of Governors, the Federal Open Market Committee, and
the officers df the 12 Federal Reserve Banks all share the
authority for making monetary policy.

Essentially, they decide

the degree of restraitt or encouragement to be imposed on bank
credit expansion.

In attempting to reach policy goals, the

Federal Reserve System (hereafter referred to as the Fed) takes
action through its open market operations, discount rate, and
reserve requirement adjustment power.

These mechanisms have a

decisive impact on the availability and cost of bank reserves.
As such, interest rates and conditions of credit, availability
of bank credit» and the supply of money are directly affected

Jack Guttentag, ’’Credit, Availability, Interest Rates,
and Monetary Policy, Southern Economic Journal. XXVI
(January, I960), p. 219.
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by Federal Reserve Monetary Policy,
Prior to the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord of 1951,
the Fed*8 monetary policy was unstable, lacked flexibility, and
rather chaotic.

Before World War I, the Fed was mostly engaged

in developing its organization, having no acute problems to
meet.

During the war, the Fed assisted in financing it by

establishing a preferential rate on paper secured by govern
ment obligations when it was discounted by member banks with
the Federal Reserve Banks.

The rate was fixed at a level which

made it possible for member banks to finance public purchases
of government securities on an installment basis.

The rate

paid to member banks by purchasers of these securities was the
coupon rate on the bonds.

The banks, then, discounted the

paper with the Fed banks at a slightly lower rate.

The end

result was large expansion of member bank and Fed bank credit.
This large supply of money along with a short supply of consumer
goods caused the Fed to raise the discount rate to 7% by the
spring of 1920.

The resulting collapse was attributed to the

Fed along with the previous inflation, but a Congressional
investigating committee cleared the Fed on these counts.^
From 1922 to World War II, Federal Reserve monetary policy
varied considerably.^Stability of monetary policy during the
1922-1929 period aided in giving the United States prosperity.
p
E. A. G-oldenweiser, American Monetary Policy. (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1951), PP. 131-137.
3Ibid., pp. 138-182.
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During this time, a national credit policy was established and
the right of the Fed to change the discount rate was asserted.
Prior to the panic of 1929, Fed actions were useless in combat
ting the speculatory movement unless money was shut off to the
stock market operations, which was beyond the Fed's control.
However, the Board turned down continual demands for increases
in the discount rate asserting that the speculation movement
wasn't any of their business.

From 1929 to 1950, the Fed em

barked on a policy of easy money, with v&Mations.

Federal

Reserve monetary policy during the depression did as much to
help combat it as it could considering the situation was world
wide.

From 1929-1933, easy monetary policy consisting of re

duced discount rates and failure to pursue a vigorous openraarket policy were evident.

During 1933-1935, the Fed pursued

additional monetary and credit ease,consisting of discount
rate reductions and open market operations.

During 1936-1938,

the Fed resorted to increases in reserve requirements to cover
up the #10 billion in excess reserves in 1936.

Although the

decline of 1937 wasn't directly attributed to these reserve
adjustments, it showed the Fed what a powerful weapon they had.
During World War II, the Fed was committed to provide the
Government with low-cost funds.

The war was subsequently

financed by enough Federal Reserve credit to enable the Govern
ment to borrow more than #200 billion.

The Fed stood ready

to buy U. S. Government securities at or above par— at a 2 1/2^
interest rate on long-term bonds and lower rates on short-term

4
issues.

This meant that these securities held by member

banks were as liquid as cash reserves, since they could be
converted to cash at or above par at any time.^As such. Fed
eral Reserve control mechanisms and their usefulness as antiinflationary measures were obliterated,»
The use of monetary control mechanisms as an integral
part of monetary policy was diminished through ^pegging"
Government securities.

As Marriner Eccles, then Chairman of

the Board of Governors, told Congress in 1947, "Control of
interest rates on Government securities...is not an effective
instrument for achieving monetary objectives."^This statement
reflected the inappropriateness of supporting Government
securities during the post-war period, which, in turn, pro
duced a skepticism about the purpose of monetary policies.
This skepticism was reinforced by the realts of several surveys
conducted during the late 1930*s which suggested that business
men were little affected by interest rates.^ The imposed stab
ility of interest rates by the Fed was believed to continue
into the post-war years.

However, those who considered the

possibility of releasing the Fed from its wartime committment
to stabilize Treasury security prices and yields rejected this
alternative due to a fear that fluctuations in interest rates

^Federal Reserve Bulletin. XLI (January, 1948), p. 16.
5 lbid.

^J. P. Ebersole, "The Influence of Interest Rates Upon
Entrepreneurial Decisions in Business," Harvard Business
Review. XLII (Autumn, 1938), pp. 35-40.
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and security prices might adversely affect the willingness
of investors to continue to hold the swollen public debt.
And, interest in monetary policy was shifted to a new weapon,
fiscal policy, which seemed to promise all the economic
control needed.
The realities of the post-war world led to recognition
that skepticism about the usefulness of flexible monetary pol
icies had been exaggerated and that an inflexible monetary
policy involved difficulties.

This recognition was brought

about, primarily, by three influences: (1) The major post
war problem turned out to be inflation rather than deflation,
(2) Fiscal policy couldn*t be relied on solely to cure econ
omic ills, and (3) Inflexible monetary policy, i,e, holding
interest rates stable, proved to involve far more difficulties
than had been anticipated.
Since inflation rather than deflation was a major post
war problem, interest in monetary policy revived due to
two reasons.

First, much of the skepticism about monetary

policy's usefulness had been based on the assumption that
monetary policy is ineffective in dealing with depressions.
However, the post-war inflation proved this irrelevent.
Secondly, inflation was widely believed to be a monetary
phenomenon and its occurance induced a search for monetary cures.
Gradual disappointment of fiscal policy also helped revive
the idea that monetary policy might be effective.

Fiscal

policy had caught the imagination of economists after

6
John M. Keynes Introduced his theories.? Keynes put the major
emphasis on the possibilities for government to Influence the
economy through direct Investment and taxation.

Government,

he argued, could Inject or withdraw Income from the economy
whlc^ would have a multiplied effect on Income because people
ordinarily spend the greater part of additions to Income and
save only a fraction.

Public Investment could be varied. If

necessary, to stimulate total income by a multiple of Itself.
Taxation could have the same effects In the opposite direction
as could reduced public Investment.

The leverage or multiplier

of a given amount of Investment or taxation would depend upon
the consumer’s marginal propensity to consume.

However, the

consumption function as part of fiscal policy used as a sole
control mechanism was^feaslble due to the need for monetary
policy In support of Its operation.
The conduct of the prevailing Inflexible monetary policy
was becoming a troublesome problem.®During World War II,
yields and prices of Treasury securities had been stabilized
In a situation In which investors had few alternative outlets
for their money.

Since post-war business was booming and In

vestment opportunities were wide-spread, "pegging" Government

?John M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment. Interest.
and Money. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 193^, pp. 95-96.
o
James. L. Knlpe, The Federal Reserve and the American
Dollar (Chapel Hill: Thé University of North Carolina Press,
1965), pp. 50-62.
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securities prices and yields not only prevented the Federal
Reserve Board from using its powers to limit inflation, but
became an inflationary force in itself.

The pegging policy

made the entire marketable debt, regardless of stated maturity,
convertible on demand into cash at the option of the holder
and, therefore, practically as liquid as money.

Moreover,

so long as all Treasury maturities were supported at fixed
prices or yields, control of the money supply passed over to
the holders of Government securities.

The Fed had to buy to

maintain support-price levels regardless of what happened to
the money supply.
The Federal Reserve Board, however, began to move cau
tiously toward a somewhat greater degree of flexibility as
early as 1946.9 The approach was to gradually withdraw from
the committment to buy short-term pegged Treasury securities.
With this, the Fed wouldn’t lose control of the money supply
if holders of the still-supported, long-term Treasury obliga
tions began to sell them to the Fed at the support prices.
Free from concern about short-term yields, the Fed could
sell short-term Governments to recapture the reserve funds
it released when it purchased long-terms.

The next develop

ment the Fed had to handle was massive sales of nearly
$11 billion of long-term Government bonds in the year ending

^United States Congress, Subcommitte on General Credit
Control, Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public
Debt; Replies To Questions and Other Material. 82nd Congress,
2nd Session, 1952, Part I, pp. 52-^4.

8

November, 1948, by insurance companies, banks, and other
investors vAio were raising cash for higher yielding private
loans and who were also protecting themselves against the
possibility that the Fed would be unable, or unwilling, to
support long-term Government bond prices indefinitely*^^
Had the Fed not taken the precaution to free short-term
Government securities, the full impact of these $11 billion
bond purchases would have caused a corresponding rise in bank
reserves and an even larger increase in the money supply.

As

it was, the sales of short-term Government securities offset
the effects of the purchases of long-terms.

Since the Treasury

was retiring securities out of its cash surplus, the Fed
holdings of Government securities actually declined during
this period.
This 1947-1948 experience could have been more chaotic
and disastrous.

Had the torrent of sales of long-term bonds

gone on for another year at the same rate, it would have ex
hausted the Fed's holdings of short-terms which were being
sold to prevent the expansion of bank reserve positions and
the money supply.

It was only a coincidence that the 1949

recession developed to slow credit demands and sales of bonds
by lending institutions.

However, the Fed had not been able

to prevent the private sector from substantially increasing

loibia.

9
its liquidity by the trade of long-term bonds for short-term
obligations sold by the Fed.
In retrospect, the Federal Reserve Monetary Policy was
rendered temporarily useless by the Truman Administration in
the 1946-1948 cycle.

The Fed was forced to rely almost entire

ly on (1) the regulation of consumer credit, and (2) pleading
with commercial banks and other interests to.excercise selfcontrol, while (3) unsuccessfully requesting legislation to
permit the institution of a new kind of supplementary reserves
whici^ supposedly, would restore the general monetaiy control
mechanisms to working order.^^The few feeble attempts at the
use of the discount rate and reserve requirement adjustment
mechanisms were meaningless due to the Fed’s pre-occupation
with Government pegged securities.

Chairman Eccles was told

in late January, 1948, that he was not going to be re-appointed
Chairman of the Board.
The outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, brought
about a wave of inflationary borrowing and spending.

The

result was a struggle between the Federal Reserve Board,
the Treasury, and the President.

The issue was whether the

long-term Government bond market should continue to be sup
ported on a 2 1/2# basis.

The outcome was the Treasury-

Federal Reserve Accord of March 3, 1951.

^^Knipe, op. cit.. pp. 54-61.

More will be

10
mentioned of the Accord later.

For the present purpose, the

Accord meant that the Fed was to conduct flexible monetary
and credit policies as needed to Influence appropriately the
Ip
general economic situation.^ Basically, It restored to the
Federal Reserve Board the ^freedom to pursue an Independent
monetary policy, subject to the obligation to maintain orderly
conditions In the government securities

m a r k e t .

"^3

Since 1951, the Fed has followed a fairly vigorous
counter-cyclical monetary policy.

Counter-cyclical monetary

policy Is that which allows the Fed "to exert pressure on
member bank reserves and causing Interest rates to rise during
business expansion and shifting, as quickly as needed, to a
policy of credit ease when business declines and prices stop
rising rapidly.

12

United States Congress, op. clt.. pp. 362-368.

^^Robert Aaron Gordon, Business Fluctuations (New York:
Harper & Row, 1961), p. 586.
, p. 587.

CHAPTER II
FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY CONTROL MECHANISMS
United States monetary policy is, primarily, the regu
lation of the volume of member bank reserves.

The Federal

Reserve Board, in its execution of monetary policy, has three
control mechanisms at its disposal: (1) the open market oper
ation, (2) member bank reserve requirement adjustment, and
(3) the discount rate.

Each of these mechanisms directly

affect member bank reserves.
The Open Market Operation
The Federal Reserve Board, in its daily operation, relies
upon open market operations as its most sensitive and effec
tive instrument for regulating member bank reserves.

The

reserve base is regulated weekly and monthly through the pur
chase and sale of securities by the central bank.

When the

central bank sells securities, member bank reserves are reduced
by the amount bought.

The reverse happens when the central

bank buys securities.
During monetary restraint, open market operations tend
to provide a smdla* amount of bank reserves than is called for
15
by the demands for bank credit. As such, the needed reserves

David P. Eastburn, The Federal Reserve on Record:
Readings on Current Issues from Statements by Federal Reserve
Officials. (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1965), p. 99.
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must be obtained through the discount window.

In determin

ing how open market operations will affect the potential for
bank credit and monetary expansion, the Board must consider
the amount of reserves member banks have borrowed at Reserve
banks or are likely to borrow at the prevailing discount rates.
The amount of excess reserves of member banks must also be
considered.

The necessity of this is that increases or

decreases in the supply of funds based upon bank reserve
requirements have a great impact upon interest rates,
A reversal of monetary restraint also sees open market
operations and discount policy coordinate.

As reserves are

supplied at the Fed's initiative, one result is that member
banks are enabled to repay their indebtedness at Reserve banks.
As such, excess reserves at member banks accrue and are used
for loan and investment expansion,
Membér Bank Reserve Requirement Adjustment
Changes in member bank reserve requirements, less flex
ible and adaptable than open market and discount operations,
are used occasionally.

Usually, these changes are applied

to situations of more than temporary significance.

Reserve

requirement percentages have been reduced in recessions, for
example, to make reserves available at the same time to all
member banks.

Sometimes reserve adjustments are made to help

p. 100,
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offset sustained gold flows or to accomodate structural
adjustments in the banking system.

Reserve adjustments are

sometimes used in coordination to discount rate changes to
intensify the degree of restraint or ease desired by the Fed.
When member bank reserve requirements are changed, the
aggregate effect on market rates of interest is similar to
open market operations, although there may be a difference
in the timing of the effect.

Most of the Impact of open

market operations on interest rates is through the multiple
expansion or contraction of bank credit and is based on the
change in bank reserves which works themselves out over a
fairly short period.

The operations themselves, however, may

be undertaken over a longer period.

In the case of member

bank reserve requirement changes, the impact on the market
interest rates are fairly immediate since the requirements
become effective on a selected date.
The Discount Rate
Basically, the discount rate is the rate charged by the
Fed when member banks come to it to borrow reserves in times
of stringency.

The Fed considers the use of the discount

window a privilège, not a right.

Discount rates are adjusted

by the Fed to signal to the public a change in or continuation
of prevailing monetary policy, to affect the cost and availa
bility of loanable funds, and to establish a pivotal rate
around which other short-term interest rates tend to form.

14
Perhaps the main purpose of the discount window is to
"permit a gradual and orderly response on the part of banks
17
to the reserve pressures that accompany monetary policy."
Member banks borrow from the Federal Reserve Banks through
two methods.

The first is when th^ rediscount short-term

commercial, industrial, agricultural, or other short-term
paper, with recourse on the borrowing bank.

This procedure

is called discounting and is practically obsolete.
method is called advance.

The second

In this practice, the member banks

may give their own promissory notes secured by paper eligible
for discounting, by Government securities, or other satisfac
tory collateral as determined by the Fed.

Nearly all member

bank borrowings are in the form of advances and discounts
under Sections 13 and 13a of the Federal Reserve Act.

Here,

advances are secured by United States Government securities
and discounts of, and advances secured by, eligible paper.
The other way of obtaining frunds from the Fed is through
advances under Section 10(b).

Here, the interest rate is one

half percent higher than under sections 13 and 13a due to the
nature of the paper secured.

Most member bank borrowing is

in the form of advances and discounts as under Sections 13
and 13a due to convenience because collateral is free of
credit risk, appraisable as to value, and more readily supplied

17

The Federal Reserve System-Purposes and Functions. A
50th Anniversary Edition prepared by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (Washington, D. C., 1963) p. 40.
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in large amounts.
In the borrowing procedure, the member bank's reserve
balance at the Fed is affected.

When a member bank borrows,

the amount of the loan is added or credited to its reserve
balance.

When the loan is repayed, the amount is deducted from

or charged against its balance.

Advances to or discounts for
18
a member bank are made for periods of up to 15 days.
Although monetary policy is ordinarly patterned after
national rather than regional considerations, in the early
years of the Fed, there was some tendency toward regional
discount rates,l9?rior to 1922, discount rates varied accord
ing to class of paper, maturity, and security,

A differential

pattern of regional discount rates was established during
the I922-I923 period.

At that time, higher and less frequent

ly changed discount rates were experienced in agricultural
regions than in Industrial and financial districts.
1927, discount rates became uniform.

During

Since the 1930's,

discount rates in all Federal Reserve districts have been
uniform except during relatively short intervals.
Discount rates still vary in differnt Reserve districts,
though for a short time only.

The Board of Directors of the

p. 41.
IQ

The Federal Reserve and the Treasury, Prepared for the
Commission on Money and Credit by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System and the United States Treasury
Department (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall, I963), p, 156,
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individual Reserve banks decide upon a discount rate ^every
fourteen days or less if deemed necessary.”^^Although the
discount rate which is set isn*t required to be the same as
that fixed by all or a part of the other member banks, the
Board can produce uniformity by disapproving all rates which
aren't the desired rate at the time.

For example, in 1957,

the New York bank reduced its discount rate from 3 1/2^ to
3 1/4^ while the remainder went down to 3%*

The Board never

approved the New York reduction until it was in line with the
other banks.

Although these instances are rare, the Board

can hold up rate change application until the majority adjusts,
then approve.

21

A lag in discount rate adjustments by Reserve banks is
not alarming.

A lag of two or three business days could

reflect a difference between Reserve boards as to the time
liness of the rate change or a difference in the regular meet
ing dates.

Longer periods of postponement may be due to a

lack of enthusiasm for the discount rate change even though
action is taken at the next regular meeting, since a special
session could have been called.

If a regular meeting of the

Reserve board (or when the board meets monthly, a date 14 days
after the regular meeting) passes without the rate moving

^^Hobart C. Carr, "A Note on Regional Differences in
Discount Rates," Journal of Finance. XV (March, I960), p. 62.
Zllbld.
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into conformity, the lag probably reflects a Judgment that the
move by the other Reserve bank or banks was premature or
mistaken.22
The use of borrowed funds by member banks to avoid a
legal reserve deficiency is intended to be a temporary supple
ment and not a substitute for a bank's adaptation of its own
asset holdings to the communities supply of and demand for
credit.

Three different influences prevent member bank

borrowings from departing too far from standard:2^(i) the
discount rate itself, (2) bank reluctance to borrow, and (3)
administrative action by discounting officials.
The discount rate itse-lf may be a deterrent against
borrowing.

Since the discount rate represents a cost which

banks pay in relation to alternative sources of funds (namely.
Federal Funds, selling assets, and drawing down balances with
and borrowing from correspondent banks), if the rate is
higher than short-term market rates, the idea of borrowing
will likely be discredited.

As such, the most relevant

comparison of the discount rate as a deterrent is with the
costs of alternative sources of funds available.

A false

notion in relation to this is that the discount rate discour
ages member bank borrowing and that this leads to a tightening
of bank lending operations.

This idea is refuted by the fact

that discount rates are generally at the low spectrum of
22ibid.. p. 63.
^^The Federal Reserve and the Treasury, op. cit.,
pp. 129-133.
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interest rates.

pii.

Reluctance toward borrowing prevents some member banks
from utilizing the discount mechanism.
borrowing is questioned by some bankers.

The soundness of
The bank's board

of directors or larger depositors may consider discount use
unfavorable.

An avoidance of indebtedness over extended

periods of time other than absolutely necessary reduces use
of the discount mechanism.

Some bankers are sensitive to

inquiries by the Federal Reserve discount officials concerning
their borrowing, and, as such, they avoid it.
Administrative action by the Federal Reserve discount
officials can prevent member banks from borrowing.

If the

Federal Reserve, through Its continuous appraisal of member
bank portfolios, finds that they are using Federal Reserve
credit for other than temporary, seasonal, or
needs, action Is taken as to why.

emergency

Federal Reserve policing

action directly involves only a minority of borrowing banks.
However, the effect of any administrative contact seems likely
to continue for some time and spread beyond the particular
member bank involved,

A major problem in policing Is that of

communloation--the conveying of a correct and uniform under
standing of the usage of the discount mechanism.

When the

discount window was revived In 1955, the Fed considered it
necessary to re-educate member bankers on the use of the

^^Paul S, Nadler, "What Does the Discount Rate Really
Do?" Banking. LVIII (June, 1966), p. 34,
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discount mechanism.

Lastly, there is a tendency for bankers

to be somewhat optimistic as to the likely duration of unex
pected reserve drains.
slow in adjusting.

As such, the member banks may be

CHAPTER III
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM'S USE
OF THE DISCOUNT RATE
Primarily, discount rate changes are designed to keep
them in line with short-term market rates— those rates on
short-term liquid securities ranging from the shortest
Treasury bills to Government and other securities of some
what longer maturity that banks hold as secondary reserves.
Discount rate changes are also considered by the Fed as a
signal of present and future intentions in regard to monetary
policy.

International monetary conditions also affect Fed's

changing of the discount rate.

Before these subjects may be

effectively discussed, an understanding of the member bank's
relation with the discount rate is needed.
A member bank's decision as to the most desirable way
for it to make an immediate adjustment in its reserve position
is affected by the level of the discount rate in relation to
market rates of interest.

The cost of adjusting a reserve

position by borrowing is the interest charge incurred.

This

cost is measured by the interest earnings sacrificed when it
sells securities to acquire funds.

As such, a bank's prefer

ence of the alternatives available to acquire funds is greatly
influenced by their cost.

In considering the cost, the relation

25The Federal Reserve and the Treasury, op. cit., p. 121.
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of the discount rate to the cost of borrowing from banks
(the Federal Funds market) and to market yields on Treasury
bills and other securities held as liquid assets or as sec
ondary reserves.
The movement of the discount rate is closely related to
the movement of short-term market interest rates.^^When credit
demands expand strongly, short-term market rates tend to rise.
This is caused by member banks selling Treasury bills and
other readily marketable paper to obtain funds to meet rapid
loan expansion.

If short-term market rates rise above the

discount rates, member banks have a greater tendency to borrow
at Reserve Banks because it is less costly in adjusting their
reserve positions.

However, the Fed, through the Reserve

Banks, is then likely to raise the discount rate in order to
keep

the discount mechanism functioning as a deterrent to

unduly rapid expansion of bank credit.

Failure to raise the

discount rate in line with market rates would encourage and
enlarge member bank use of the discount window.

However, if

the discount rate is raised above market rates, member banks
will sell Government securities to the Fed to satisfy reserve
requirements because of less cost.

These sales tend to

drive short-term interest rates up to or above the discount
rate because they increase the market supply of short-term
securities relative to demand.

^^The Federal Reserve System-Purposes and Functions.
op. cit.. pp. 47-49.
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Therefore, In a period of strong credit demands, short-term
market rates and the discount rate are likely to rise con
gruent ly until the demand pressures subside.
Numerous influences affect the timing and extent of dis
count rate changes by the Fed,

As mentioned, discount rates

will be increased when they are lagging behind market rates
in order to keep the discount window under control and to
maintain a discipline of indebtedness on member banks.

Since

discount rates which are higher than market rates will encour
age repayment of existing debt to the Reserve banks, a rise
may reflect this fact.

Sometimes balance-of-payments consid

erations affect the timing and extent of discount rate changes;
since discount rates deal with short-term market rates, they
have an impact on international short-term capital movements.

27

If short-term market rates fall below discount rates in times
of easing credit and less pressing loan demands, discount
rates would likely be lowered to short-term rate levels.

In

this situation, discount rates would be lowered in order to
reduce member banks' incentive to repay Reserve banks.

This

would encourage banks to utilize a greater portion of their
reserves to expand loans and investments.
The discount rate has, at times, remained high or low
relative to market rates for a long period.

This phenomenon

^^The Federal Reserve and the Treasury, op. cit.. p. 123.
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results either because the frequency of Treasury financing
has left few opportunities at the time discount rates could
be conveniently altered, or because market rates may have
been considered to be under transitory forces and expected
to return closer to earlier levels and to the discount rate.
During recession and monetary ease, a discount rate as low as
market rates might not be considered necessary because at this
time discount rate changes have little effect on banking
actions.2®
The discount rate is sometimes raised for technical
reasons; to keep it in line with money market rates else
where.29This is done so that member banks are not overly
tempted to try to borrow when they should be meeting reserve
stringencies by reducing secondary reserves.

Such string

encies occur when member banks lend aggressively and must
borrow for this reason rather than through unanticipated fund
outflows.
Discount rates may be changed by the Fed to signal to
the public a change in, or reinforcement of, the prevailing
Federal Reserve credit and monetary policy.

When the Fed

raises the discount rate, it indicates that credit policy
either has been tightening or will soon tighten.

A reduction

of the discount rate proclaims that a period of greater

28ibld.
^Nadler,

oe.

clt., p. 35.
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credit ease and lessened restraint will be prevalent.
Although discount rates may be increased by the Fed with the
purpose of signalling monetary intentions, adjustments, through
their own nature, accomplish this purpose.

However, perhaps

the greatest significance from a discount rate change is in
signalling Fed's present and future intentions.
There is a general understanding that when the discount
rate is raised, interest rates are likely to rise generally
throughout the economy.

When discount rates fall, the reverse

is considered to happen.

The notion often held is that when

the discount rate rises, it-costs member banks more to borrow
from the Fed, thus banks have to offset the higher cost
through higher bank rates, and these higher rates in turn
with the borrowing and spending of the general public.
However, it is the Federal Reserve's open market operations
which accompany the discount rate change that alters the state
of the money market.
When the Fed raises the discount rate, open market oper
ations supplement the change to produce the desired result
of the move.

With the discount rate increase, sales of

Government securities absorb

reserves from member banks and

lessen the availability of credit.

This, in turn, makes

credit tighter and makes it more difficult to borrow.

When

the discount rate is lowered, open market operations consist
of purchasing securities.
30 Ibid.

This action brings about the easing

25
of credit availability rather than the discount rate change
itself.

The lowering of the discount rate in this instance

simply signals Fed's easy policy since there is usually little
impact on the economy through the lowered rate.
Although interest rates than banks charge usually move
in the same direction as discount rates, the result isn't due
solely to the discount rate change.

It reflects the expec

tation of the financial community that the availability of
credit is being altered by the Fed and that basic supply and
demand forces will bring about the change in interest rates
that the Fed is signalling.

The greatly fluid financial

markets react to the expected future conditions immediately.
Thus, banks often change their lending rates as soon as the
discount rate is altered,

^^Nadler, op, cit.. p, 35.

CHAPTER IV
FEDERAL RESERVE DISCOUNT RATE CHANGES:

1951-1965

The importance of the discount rate mechanism was
greatly increased by the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord on
March 3, 1951.^^The Accord provided that the prices of Govern
ment securities were to be no longer ^pegged” by open market
actions; that short-term Government securities would be
allowed to fluctuate more than in the past, around the dis
count rate.

The practice of acquiring loanable funds by

selling Government securities at a profit was eliminated.
The Accord moved that securities could only be sold at a dis
count thus causing banks to become more reluctant to take
book losses on Government sales in order to make loans.

As

such, the discount window began to look more and more attrac
tive to member banks.

Toward the end of 1952, member bank

borrowings from the Fed had climbed to over $1.5 billion from
$242 million in March, 1951.

Another stipulation of the

Accord was that the discount rate would remain at 1 3,4# for
the remainder of 1951.

The Accord, then, re-affirmed the

Federal Reserve System's purpose, that is to conduct flexible

^^George W. McKinney, Jr., The Federal Reserve Discount
Window. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, I960),
p. 22.
NOTE: All figures of discount rates, money market rates,
and member bank borrowings in this paper were obtained from
various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
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monetary and credit policies as needed to influence appropri
ately the general economic situation.
The first discount rate change after the Accord was
brought about at the end of a six month plateau of the 19501954 cycle.

Rising employment, stable values, and economic

growth were characteristic at the end of 1952,

Since the

expansion represented an inflationary potential, the Fed
continued to pursue a policy directed toward slowing the
pace of bank credit expansion with a goal of reducing inflation
ary activity.

As such, the discount rate was increased dur

ing January 16-23, 1953, (as mentioned, there is a slight
lag between Reserve Bank adoption of the uniform discount
rate) to 2% from 1 'b/k% set in August, 1950,

The increase

was designed to align it with short-term market rates and to
help restrict undue expansion in bank credit by promoting
greater reluctance on the part of member banks to resort to
the discount

w i n d o w .
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The discount rate increase was to late to have any mean
ing as a control measure, however.

Three month Treasury bills

had risen to 1.81^ by July, 1952, and were 1.99# on the week
ending January 10, 1953.

Federal Funds rates had slightly

surpassed the previous 1 3/4# discount rate in late December

^^Eastburn, pp, cit,. p, 82,

30
and early January.

The initial effect of the discount rate,

however, was a stricter attitude toward member bank borrowing
on the part of Federal Reserve bank loan officers.

This

attitude is considered to have brought about the borrowing
33
reduction, not the rate change itself.
In addition to the discount rate change, the Fed used
another weapon.

In February, 1953, margin requirements on

loans for purchasing and carrying listed securities were
reduced from 75% to 50% of market value.

The Fed wanted to

lower the requirement that would be adequate to prevent
excessive use of credit for purchasing and carrying stocks.
Also, between January and April, 1953, the Fed open market
committee sold and redeemed $800 million of United States
Government securities to offset seasonal changes affecting
member bank reserves and to maintain pressure on these reserve
positions.

33Knipe, op. cit.. p. 285.
^^Eastbum, op. cit.. p. 81.
NOTE: After each discussion of a change in the discount
rate, a chart will follow illustrating money market rates,
the discount rate, and member bank borrowing for the year of
the discount rate adjustment.
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The context of the 1954 discount rate changes was in a
relatively mild recession.
August, 1954,

The contraction lasted until

The recession was due, primarily, to inventory

in that general defense expenditures declined whereas non
inventory investment didn*t.^^The ensuing Fed discount rate
reductions in the first half of the year signalled an easier
monetary and credit policy aimed at lowering the cost of
money to stimulate Investment in inventory.
The two discount rate reductions in 1954 were designed
to align it closer to market rates of interest and to elim
inate any undue deterrent to bank borrowing from the Fed,^^
The first discount rate reduction was during February 5-15,
1954, to 1 3/4# from 2#,

Three month Treasury bills averaged

1,18# in January and 1,01# on the week ending January 30.

The

Federal Funds rate was down to 0,78# in January down from
1,61# in November, 1953.

The prime rate (that rate of interest

which member banks charge customers of unquestioned credit)
was reduced to 3# from 3.25# just prior to the second discount
rate change in 1954 in anticipation of it.
rate change occured during April 14-May 21.
reduced to 1 1/2# from 1 3/4#.

The second discount
The rate was

Three month Treasury bill

yields averaged 1,03# in March and 1,00# on the week ending

35(jordon, op. cit,. p, 489.
^^Eastburn, op, cit.. p. 82,
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April 10.

Before uniformity In the discount rate was reached,

Treasury bill rates had dropped to .75% on the week ending
May 15 from .96% In April.

The Federal Funds rate dropped

from 1.56% In February to .75% In May.

Member bank borrowing

Increased by nearly #200 million In February over the January
average, but slowly decreased and remained relatively constant.
(See page 34)
Other Fed countercyclical mechanisms coordinated with
the manipulation of the discount rate.

Buying rates on 90-

day bankers* acceptances were reduced from 2 1/8% to 1 3/4%
In February and to 1 1/2% In Aprll-May.

The Fed reasoning

here Is the same as discount rate reduction reasoning.

Also,

open market operations produced a net sales of about $900
million of United States Government securities between January
and June.

These sales were to absorb part of the reserves

made available by seasonal deposit contraction and to return
the flow of currency thereby further

easing bank reserve

positions.37
The Importance of the discount rate mechanism as a
countercyclical monetary tool was emphasized In January,
1955, by a Federal Reserve revision of Regulation A, that
which deals with advances and discounts.

The revision con

doned and promoted the Idea of the discount rate mechanism.

3?Ibld.
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The revision stated that access to Federal Reserve discount
facilities is granted as a privilege of membership to the
Federal Reserve in light of the following principles:^®
”1, Credit is generally extended on a short-term basis
to a member bank in order to enable it to adjust its
asset position when necessary because of developments
such as sudden withdrawal of deposits or seasonal
requirements for credit beyond those which can be
reasonably met by use of the bank's own resources.
2. Federal Reserve credit is available for longer
periods when necessary in order to assist member
banks in meeting unusual situations, such as may
result from national, regional, or local defaults or
from exceptional circumstances involving only part
of the banks. Under ordinary conditions, continuous
use of Federal Reserve credit by member banks over
a considerate period of time is not regarded as ap
propriate.
3. Each Federal Reserve bank gives due regard to the
purpose of credit and to its probable effects upon
the maintenance of sound credit conditions, both as
to the individual institutions and the economy, gen
erally. It keeps informed of and takes into account
the general character and amount of loans and invest
ments of member banks. It determines if banks are
borrowing principally from rate differentials and
whether the bank is extending an undue amount of
credit for the speculatory carrying of or trading
in securities, real estate, or commodities, or other
wise.
4. Application for Federal Reserve credit accomo
dation and considered by a Federal Reserve bank is
in light of its best Judgment in conformity with the
foregoing principles and with the provisions of the
Federal Reserve Act and Regulation A.”

^^Federal Reserve Bulletin. XLI (January, 1955),
pp. 8—l4.
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In 1955, the economic situation was that of the begin
ning of the 1955-1957 durable goods boom.
unique.

This upswing was

First, It was the first post-war expansion not

directly related to war. It was concentrated In the durable
goods Industrie*, and unemployment did not fall below four
percent.

The rapid rise In prices and the vigorous Invest

ment boom led monetary authorities to follow a restrictive
monetary policy, while the slow growth In output after 1955
and the existence of pockets of unemployment led many observers
to advocate a policy of monetary ease.^^
As such, 1955 was an active year for discount rate
adjustments.

The first discount rate change was an Increase

during April 14-May 2 to 1 3/4^ from 1 1/2%.

Since the econ

omy was In the eighth month of the expansionary upswing and
Fed policy had been greatly restraining through the eight
months, the Increase couldn't be regarded as a signal.

The

rate was, primarily, raised to align It with open-market
money rates and to make borrowing by banks more expensive.
Three month Treasury bills averaged 1.28% In March and were
1.49% on the week ending April 9*

During the adoption of the

discount rate by member banks, bill rates rose to 1.63% on the
week ending April 16, to 1.65% on the week ending April

^^Gordon, op. clt.. p. 493.
^Ognlpe, pp. clt.. p. 285.
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23, and down to 1.62% on the week ending April 30.

The Fed

eral Funds rate was 1.42# in.early April and 1.69# in May.
In conjunction with the discount rate increase, margin require
ments on loans for purchasing or carrying listed securities
were increased from 60# to 70# of market value.

The Fed

wanted to help prevent an excessive use of credit for pur
chasing or carrying securities in a period of increasing use
of credit for carrying securities.
As the upswing continued, the Fed applied restrictive
policies more firmly.

Discount rates were increased from

1 3/4# to 2 1/4# from August 4 to September 13 and to 2 l/2#
during November 18-23.

The Fed wanted to keep the discount

rate in appropriate relationship with market rates of inter
est to maintain a deterrent on excessive borrowing by member
42
banks at the Reserve banks. Three month Treasury bills aver
aged 1.60# in July and increased to 2.07# on the week ending
November 19.

Federal Funds rates averaged 1.92# in July and

2.85# in November.

Insofar as the discount raises in August

and November had any value in confirming a restrictive Fed
policy of long standing, it was somewhat dissipated in the
confustion of the August-September raises.

The Cleveland

Reserve Bank increased its rate from 1 3/4# to 2 1/4# in

^^Eastburn, o£. cit.. p. 83.
42 Ibid.. p. 85.
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August while the remainder went only to 2%.

In September,

the other eleven Reserve banks increased their discount rates
to Cleveland's 2 1/4^.

This disparity reduced any effect of

a signal intention by the Fed.
Repercussions on the money market after the November
18-23 discount rate increase were extensive.

Three month

Treasury bills rose to 2.44^ in mid-November, the highest in
25 years.

The price of Government bonds dropped sharply.

Member banks raised interest rates on loans to brokers and
security dealers from 3 1/2^ to 3 1/4#.

Commercial paper

dealers and major finance companies boosted by 1/8 point the
interest they charged on short-term loans.^^Pederal funds
were quoted at over 2.5# which Indicated that tightness was
prevalent throughout the banking system and the major finance
companies raised rates by 1/4#, the seventh such increase of
1955.^^Prime rates rose to 3 1/4# from 3#'on August 4, and
to 3 1/2# on October 14.^^After the November discount rate,
there was an indication of another increase, but it never
materialized.
The Federal Reserve Board wanted the money market to

"Another Push on the Brakes," Business Week.
(November 26, 1955), p. 25.
^^"Bank Loans Will Cost More,"BusinessWeek.
(September 3, 1955), p. 32.
^^"Another Push on the Brakes," op. cit.. p. 25.
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tighten to slow down the economy.

The Fed denied a charge

that it was trying to halt borrowing.

It said that it didn't

intend to halt legitimate borrowing, but it did intend to
control the supply of credit by keeping reins on the pre
vailing expansion and to hold prices in check.^^Since member
banks were borrowing more freely (See page 40 ), and liking it,*
the Fed wanted to put a limit on this by slightly penalizing
this activity.
During 1955, Federal Reserve open market operations were
actively combating inflation.

Between March and December,

open market operations made net purchases of bankers' accep
tances totaling $28 million to recognize the increased use of
them by business as a means of financing international trade.
Between July and December, the Fed made outright purchases
of Treasury bills totaling $700 millon net to aid member
banks in meeting reserve needs of seasonal nature and further
increasing indebtedness.

The Fed also purchased new Treasury

certificates of indebtedness of $167 million during November
and December to supply reserves and to be consistent with
the prevailing open market policy.^?

Ibid.. p. 26.
47
_
'Eastburn, op. cit.. p. 84.
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Çy the beginning of 1956, the economy was operating to
full capacity, with demand outstripping supply in the durable
goods industries.

Consumer expenditures for other than

services flattened out markedly in 1956 and the proportion of
income saved began to rise.
declined during 1956.

As such, inventory investment

Although a minor recession was in order,

continued expansion in business fixed investment, a rapid
increase in exports, and a rise in federal expenditures after
kO
the middle of 1956 combated that possibility. Thus, a heavily
restrictive monetary policy was imposed until May and was
eased in the second half of the year.
In light of the restrictive policy in effect, the discount
rate was increased during April 13-20 by 1/4# at ten Reserve
banks to 2 3/4# and to 3# at the San FransIsco and Minneapolis
banks.

The rate rise was a matter of good timing.

Reserves” were at a negative $4o8 million in March.
bank borrowing was up to #993 million.

**Free
Member

Three month Treasury

bill rates averaged 2.25# in March and were up to 2.38# on the
week ending April 7.
in March.

Federal Funds rates averaged over 2.5#

The rationale behind the discount rate increase

was to increase restraint on credit expansion in view of a
sharp increase in bank credit in March and indications of
broad increases in spending, growing demands for credit, and

48

Gordon, 0£. cit.. p. 495.

42

upward pressures on prices and costs.4#
Up to this point, the prevailing restrictive monetary
policy had not evoked public opposition.

However, with the

granting of San Fransisco and Minneapolis a 1/4^ higher
discount rate, the Fed found itself in a quandary.

This

conspicuous action was taken at a time when the business sit
uation had been developing a few signs of weakness and the
production total had leveled off for several months.

Instead

of keeping quiet and assessing the situation more throughly,
the Fed acted on the rate in a way that suggested that all
twelve banks felt more restraint was needed but two felt that
much more was needed.

The press, to which the Fed said

nothing, just announced the actions.

The Fed, for its own

record, commented that the raise *also served as a signal to
those businesses planning to finance plant and equipment ex
pansion throught the capital markets that higher borrowing
costs might be anticipated if the supply of savings was taxed
further by demands for capital."^0
Partly due to the furor which arose after the April move,
the Fed instituted an easing policy which lasted from May,
1956, through January, 1957.

However, the other discount rate

change in 1956 was an increase during August 24-31 when the
Fed approved raises of 1/4^ to the ten banks which were not
49

Eastburn, op. cit.. p. 85.
^^Knipe, op. cit.. pp. 286-287.

43
already at 3^.

The rationale.was to move the discount rate

in conformity with rises in market rates resulting from vig
orous credit demands.

Three month Treasury bills averaged

2.31# in July and increased to 2.64# on the week ending August
18,

Federal Funds rates averaged 2.81# in July.

Also, the

Fed wanted to signal the financial and business community
and the public the need for credit restraint and for resis
tance to inflationary developments.^^In light of an easing
action by the Fed, however, this increase was puzzling.
Perhaps, the prime objective of the August rate increase
was to limit the supply of funds so that credit would become
52
tighter, excluding meeting seasonal needs. The Fed hoped
that the new raise would cool the demand for credit and thus
keep the economy from indulging in a speculative inflationary
outburst.

If the Fed supplied all the credit that the business

and consumer wanted, an all out inflation would be incited, due
to the fact that money was exceeding need due partly to the
end of the steel strikes, which was bringing about a wave
of inventory accumulation.

Since the Fed didn't want lenders

to give into the pleas of borrowers, the prime rate was in
creased from 3 3/4# to 4# in anticipation of tighter

money

due to the proposed discount rate increase in August.

^^Knipe, op. cit.. p. 287.
^^”Banks Leap in to Raise Money Rates," Business Week,
(August 25, 1956), pp. 30-31.
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Open market operations again complemented discount rate
changes in 1956.

During April and May, open market operations

included sales of Government securities of #550 million to
supplement the April discount rate increase.

The move was

made to increase restraint on credit expansion.

During

August and November, Fed open market operations purchased
nearly #1 billion of Government securities.^^This action was
taken during the August discount rate increase.

In this

instance, open market operations seemed to be in opposition
rather than supplementary to the discount rate change.

Since

open market operations usually consist of sales of Govern
ment securities during a discount rate increase to tighten
credit, the August-November action seemed out of place.
However, since the Fed was adopting an easing monetary policy,
the open market operations were to supply member banks with
reserves since the discount rate was only trying to match
short-term market rates.
The 1956 discount rate increases may be said to have begun
a new evolution of the importance of it as a signal of Federal
Reserve intentions.

Since member banks actively resumed the

pre-depression practice of borrowing, the discount rate became
a major control weapon which the Fed chose to exploit.

A

cardinal point in Federal Reserve doctrine is that the value
of member bank borrowing is the decisive factor in determining

^^Eastburn, op. cit.. p. 85.
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the condition of the money market.

54

The discount rate increase from '3% to 3 1/2# during
August 9-23, 1957, was a timing error by the Fed.

By August,

the economy had been in an upswing for 36 months.

The economy

seemed tired with imbalances in inventories and plant and
equipment and general business activity continued to move
sideways.

The first half of 1957 saw new orders for durable

goods declining, excess capacity curtailing investment pro55
grams, tight money, and declining profit margins.^Federal
Reserve policy was that of general credit restraint.

Disagree

ment was encountered with the policy because of the uneven
effects it had on different prospective borrowers; e.g. funds
lack affected the financing of new homes, small business,
schools, roads, and hospitals.

Also, the policy was attacked

because it diverted lending to lending and Investing institu
tions which could get permanent business from small and large
business.

As for the money market, three month Treasury bills

had been averaging above the 3# discount rate since December,
1956.

Federal Funds rates had been averaging 3# since the

first of 1957.

Member bank borrowings had climbed steadily.

And, the prime rate had been increased from 4# to 4 1/2# in

^^hEdward C. Simmons, ”A Note on the Revision of Federal
Reserve Discount Policy, XI (December, 1956), p. 413.
^^Gordon, op. cit.. pp. 496-497.
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August in anticipation to a discount rate increase and tight
er money.

The discount rate increase which followed was the

seventh consecutive increase of credit restrictions since
April, 1955, and the 5 l/2% rate was the highest in 23 years.
The rational

behind the discount rate increase, accord

ing to the Federal Reserve Board was to bring it in closer
alignment with short-term money rates and to maintain a
57
restrictive effect of member bank borrowing. Undoubtedly,
this reasoning must be taken in a different light considering
the tremendous lag in adjustment to market rates,

William

McGhesney Martin, Ohaifman of the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors at that time and presently, said that strong in
flationary pressures still existed.

Thus, he was willing to

see money get tighter if demand for credit kept on growing.
"Restraint on the growth of credit is still required," accord
ing to Chairman Martin, "because Inflation is clearly the most
critical economic problem now facing this c o u n t r y . T h e Fed
thinking was that the economy would begin expansion with the
removal of inflationary pressures and a greater-than-seasonal
demand for credit.^9

^^"New Discount Move Adds Heat To Tight Money Debate,"
Business Week. (August 17, 1957), p. 29.
^"^Eastburn,

cit.. p. 86,

^^"New Discount Move Adds Heat To Tight Money Debate,"
op. cit.. p. 30.
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The Immediate down-turn of the economy after the discount
rate increase in August couEln*t be blaimed entirely on it.

it

could be said that the Fed failed miserably in using the rate
as an economic or public relations tool.

The Board appa rently

saw the lack of flness in its discount rate manipulation in
that it tried to minimize the meaning of the rise, contrary
to the basic use of the rate, a signal of Fed intentions.
The New York Times on August 11, 1937, correctly defined the
Fed's actions by stating, "Federal Reserve Board officials-took pains to term the subsequent advance in the discount
rate as routine and largely meaningless, a symbolic evidence
of continued steady restraint.

In recent years, they were

careful to point out,, changes in the discount rate more often
followed changes in other market rates than led them.**^^
The other discount rate change in 1957 was considered as
the first one which "said something to the world".

Between

November 15 and December 2, the Fed approved a discount
reduction from the prevailing 3 1/2# to 3#*

This move was

considered by economic and financial experts as a model oper
ation on the part of discount rate manipulation for the sig
nalling of the Fed's intentions, a reversal of the previous
tight credit and money policy.

Although the Fed bowed to

the Eisenhower Administration's pressure through concern of

^^Knipe, 22. cit.. p. 289.
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a threat of business downturn, the Board still continued to
eqplBSize inflationary d a n g e r s . s u c h , the reduction was
aimed to reduce the cost of borrowing from the Reserve banks
and to eliminate any undue restraint on bank borrowing in
view of the decline in business activity and evidences of
62
economic recession. An important outcome of the discount
rate reduction was the prime rate decrease from 4 \/2% to
4#.
Open market operations in 1957 were complementary to the
discount rate changes.

From July to mid-October small amounts

of Government securities were bought and sold by the Fed.
These actions supplemented the discount rate mechanism in
that it met changing reserve needs and maintained continuing
presure on member bank reserve positions.

Open market oper

ations from mid-October to December supplemented the NovemberDee ember discount rate reduction.

The operations increased

the availability of bank reserves and subsequently cushioned
recessionary tendencies in the economy.
Discount rate adjustments in 1958 were numerous due to
a recession during the first half of the year and economic
expansion during the second half.

The contraction which

started in September, 1957, lasted until April, 1958, and was

^^Knipe, as* Pit.. p. 290.
^^Eastburn, op. cit., p. 86.
^Ibld. .

.
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one of the shortest contractions of the last century.
However, the briefness of it was accompanied by extremity.
Industrial production declined 13.7%, Gross National Product
declined 4.7%, and unemployment was the most severe of the
recessions experienced since World War II.^^The recession was
unique, however, in that prices continued to rise, contrary
to typical recession price behavior.
As such, discount rates were reduced during the recession
to lower the cost of borrowing from Reserve banks and to
increase the availability of bank reserves in order to en
courage dpsiit and monetary

e x p a n s i o n .

first discount rate

change during the recession was a reduction from 3% to 2 1/4%
during January 22-March 21.

The changes were made in a series

of steps with San Francisco the last Reserve bank to conform.
This lag blotted, somewhat, the effect of the reductions.
Three month Treasury bill rates on the week ending January 18
dropped to 2.57% from the December, 1957, average of 3.04%.
Federal Funds rates dropped from 2.18% in December, 1957, to
1.67% in January, 1958.

The prime rate was reduced to 4% from

4 1/2% in January in anticipation of lowered discount rates.
The January-March discount rate reduction was timely and
signalled an extremely easy monetary policy in that reserve
requirements were also reduced.

^^Grordon, o£. cit.. p. 497.
^^Eastburn, o£. cit.. p. 87.

In February, reserve
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requirements on demand deposits were reduced to 19 1/2# from
20# central reserve city banks; to 17 1/2# from 18# at reserve
city banks; and to 11 1/2# from 12# at country banks.
action freed #500 million of reserves.

This

In March, reserve

requirements on demand deposits were again lowered to 19#
at central reserve city banks; to 17# at reserve city banks;
and to 11# at country banks.

This move freed an additional

#500 million of reserves. 'These actions further supplemented
easy monetary policy in progress.
In April, another assault against the recession was waged
by the Fed.

The discount rate was reduced during April 18-

March 9 to 1 3/4#.

This change lagged behind the easy mone

tary and credit policy in effect since three month Treasury
bills averaged 1.30# in March and were down to 1.10# on the
week ending April 12.

Federal Funds varied around 1.0# in

March and the beginning of April.

Reserve requirements on

demand deposits were again reduced to 18# at central reserve
city banks and to 16 1/2# at res eve

city banks.

This move

freed an additional #450 million bf reserves.^®A major reason
for the use of two control mechanisms by the Fed in April
was to get member banks to lower the prime rate, which they
weren't anxious to do.

Rather than lower the prime rate, they

were cutting service charges, reducing the necessity of

^^Eastburn, op. cit.. p. 87.
GGlbld.
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maintaining a large compensatory deposit ratio, and arranging
short-term loans for preferred customers through banker's
acceptances, which then cost less than 2^*^%owever, the
prime rate was reduced to 3 1/2# from 4# on the day of the
discount rate change announcement.
In addition to the discount rate and reserve requirement
reductions during the first half of 1958, open market oper
ations encouraged bank credit and monetary expansion.

Between

and including February and June, nearly #2.2 billion of United
States Government securities were purchased by the Fed to
supplement reserve requirement actions in further increasing
availability of

r e s e r v e s .

In retrospect, the extremity of Federal Reserve monetary
and credit actions to combat the then prevailing recession
was tremendous.

The discount rate, during the first half of

1958, was reduced by 1 l/4# beginning with the well timed
January reduction.

Reduced reserve requirements between and

including February and April released nearly #1.5 billion of
reserves.

And, open market operations during the first half

of the year increased member bank reserve positions by #2.2
billion.

With such concentrated Fed action, it is clear why

the recession didn't last any longer than it did.

"Banks Follow the Fed's Lead," Business Week.
(April 26, 1958), pp. 29-30.
70Eastburn, op. cit.. pp. 87-88.
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The upswing began in May, 1958.
fourth month.

By August, it was in its

As such, monetary policy was reversed to a

restrictive policy beginning with a discount rate increase
from 1 3/4# to 2# between August 15 and September 23.

This

increase was seemingly more congruent with the prevailing
economic and monetary conditions than in the past and was
more tuned to the diming three-month Treasury bill rate
which averaged .91# in July and 1.58# on the week ending
August 16.

The Federal Funds rate had met the discount rate

by August.

Other than to keep the discount rate in an appro

priate relationship with market rates, the action increased
the cost of borrowing by member banks in case of increasing
demands for bank credit.

The last discount rate manipulation

of 1958 was during October 24-November 7 with an increase of
1/2# to 2 1/2#.

The rational behind this move was the same

as the previous change.

Three month Treasury bills had aver

aged 2.44# in September and 2.67# on the week ending October
18.

The Federal Funds rate was averaging slightly above the

2# discount rate.
While the discount rate changes couldn't be called out
standing announcements to the public since it whs expected that
credit would become tighter during the upswing, they were
more aligned with the economic and monetary conditions of the
time.

Since with each upswing, the volume of stock purchased

increases, the Fed raised margin requirements on loans for
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purchasing and/or carrying listed securities from 70^ to
90^ of market value.?^One Important outcome of the discount
rate increases in 1958 was the rise of the prime rate from
3 1/2% to ^% during the August adjustment.
The Federal Reserve Board applied a restrictive monetary
policy during 1959 to combat the prevailing upswing so that
it wouldn't become inflationary.

Subsequently, the discount

rate was increased three times during the yeag largely as a
routine matter.

The rational behind all three discount rate

increases was to keep the rates in appropriate relationship
with the rise in market rates resulting from vigorous credit
7o
demands and to restrain undue credit expansion. ^
The first change of the discount rate in 1959 was during
March 6-16 to 3^ from 2 l/2%.

Three month Treasury bills had

hovered around 2.8# since December, 1958, and were 2.76# on
the week ending February 28, 1959.

Federal Funds rates had

increased by 1/2# since the beginning of the year to around
3#.

Since the public already knew what the Fed's intentions

were through open market actions, the discount rate increase
in March was no new signal of intent.
months late.

It was, perhaps, three

Prior to the increase. Fed open market opera

tions sold $1 billion of United States Government securities
to maintain restraint on credit expansion.T^As such, the

71 Ibid.. p. 88.

72ibld.. p. 89.

73lbld..
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monetary system was controlled by open market operations until
the discount rate changes came about.
Some factions of the money market were affected by the
March discount rate change.

Three month Treasury bills rose

to 2.85% on the week ending March 14, but subsequently fell to
2.76% by the end of the month.

Yields on Treasury notes and

bonds followed a similar pattern.
The next two discount rate changes of the year were also
routine in nature.

The second discount rate increase was

during the May 29-June 12 period by 1/2% to 3 1/2%.

Three

month Treasury bills averaged 2.95% in April and 2.85% on
the week ending May 23.

The Federal Funds rate had slightly

surpassed the 3% discount rate before the change.

The affect

of this discount adjustment was felt in the prime rate which
was increased from 4% to 4 1/2% in May in anticipation of the
discount rate increase.

The third discount rate increase was

during September 11-18, in the plateau of the 1958-1961 cycle,
to 4% from 3 1/2%.

Three month Treasury bills averaged 3.38%

in August and were 3.95% on the week ending September 5 and
4.02% on the week ending September 12.

The Federal Funds

rate was also varying around 4% at the time.

Nothing out

standing can be said about these discount rate increases
since they were well timed and considered as an accepted part
of counter-cyclical monetary policy.

Open market operations

at this time bought and sold small amounts of United States
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Government securities to supply special reserve needs for
limited periods.
The previous five discount rate increases were part of
a more refined Fed discount policy.

The increases, aggregat

ing 2%, were mostly on time with economic conditions and
public demands as well as with the Administration's desires.
The performance of the Fed during this period established the
discount rate more as an integral part of the counter-cyclical
mechanisms the country has at its disposal.
In i960, the Fed accurately predicted an economic down
turn by increasing open market operations in late March*
Nearly #1.5 billion of Government securities were purchased.

75

However, the three month Treasury bill rate had dropped from
its cyclical high of 4.49^ in December, 1959, to 5.29# in
May, i960.. Member bank borrowing had dropped from #905 million
in January to #502 million in May.

As such, the discount

rate reduction from 4# to 3 1/2# during June 5-14 was rather
late.

However, the rate decrease was instigated to closer

align it with market rates and to reduce the cost of member
bank borrowing from the Reserve banks.

The discount rate

adjustment was a signal of Fed's attitude, in that inflation
was no longer considered a problem, both production and
employment were presumed to be stimulated by the lower rate,
and that a change toward more flexible monetary policy was

74ibia.

75lbld.. p. 90.
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being conducted as was considered necessary by the public.?^
After the change, the stock market jumped sharply.

The reason

for this was that investors possibly considered the increase
the little extra insurance needed for a good business year
to come.

Member banks, however, still holding onto a 5^

prime rate, wanted to see their deposit— or reserve— increased
before they endorsed a cut in lending rates.
The rational for the other discount rate reduction in
i960 was the same as for the previous action.

Three month

Treasury bills averaged 2.30# in July and 2.13# on the week
ending August 6.

The Federal Funds rate was near 3# by August.

Member bank borrowing decreased from #502 million in May to
#388 million in July.

As such, the discount rate was reduced

by 1/2# to 3# during August 12-September 9.

Perhaps the most

significant reaction to come out of this action was the
reduction of the prime rate during August 22-23 from 5# to
4 1/2#.

This discount rate manipulation can be considered

well timed and in line with the then prevailing monetary
ease.

To complement the discount rate action. Fed open

market operations purchased about #1 billion of Government
securities.

This action, taken during August through November,

was to help member banks meet changing reserve needs and
to help offset the impact of a large gold outflow without

?^"Fed Loosens Up Another Notch,” Business Week,
(June 11, i960), p, 25.
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exerting undue downward pressure on short-term Treasury bills
which could stimulate further outflow of fbnds.^^In addition
to open market operations, the Fed authorized member banks
to count about $500^of their vault cash as required reserves,
and It authorized reduced reserve requirements on demand
deposits at central reserve city banks to be reduced to
17 1/2^ from 185^.

This move released an additional #125

million of reserves, and was made, primarily, to aid member
78
banks In meeting seasonal needs for reserve funds.'
Nearly three years passed before the Fed again used the
discount rate mechanism.

Since the United States was exper

iencing economic prosperity and growth since August, i960,
there were numerous pressures on the money market.

However,

these pressures were not significant enough to warrant directed
monetary control measures other than open market operations.
Regulation Q, though, was revised in December, I96I, to allow
member banks to pay 3 1/2^ on savings deposits and 4^ on those
over one year.

Maximum rates on time deposits from 6 months

to one year were raised to 3 1/2# and to 4# for those over
one year.T^This revision allowed the member banks to compete
more effectively for savings and time depoàits to offset for
eign investment and to allow a monetary base to build up for
future economic growth.

Also, reserve requirements were

T^Eastburn, op. cit.. p. 91.

^^Ibid.

?^Ibid.. p.92.
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adjusted on time deposits to
million In reserves.

from 5%, releasing |78o

This move was made to minimize down

ward pressure on Interest rates on short-terms and to allow
a monetary base to build up for future economic growth.

Other

than these actions, then, the open market operations performed
the role of monetary stabilizer, and, as such, monetary policy
turned quite Inflexible.
During the Interim, the money market,rates were consider
ably below the prevailing '5% discount rate.

Three month

Treasury bills averaged 2.36# monthly In 1961 and 2.77# In
1962, and 2.92# In the first half of I963.

Federal Funds

rates varied from a high of 2.89# to a low of 1.35# during
1961 and 1962. Member bank borrowing from Reserve banks
averaged #79.5 million monthly In 1961, #78.7 million In
1962, and #153.3 million during the first half of I963.
Although the scene was set for a discount rate Increase to
bring it Into closer

alignment with short-term rates of In

terest and to stimulate member bank borrowing, this was not
done.

As a result, with the low yields received on short

term securities of American Issue, an Influx of foreign short
term Investment was prevalent during the Interim.period.
The United States had witnessed, during the past five
years, a persistent build-up of Its short-term liabilities
to foreigners, nearly #17 billion.

This balance of payments

deficit occured even after the payment of #18 billion In gold
In consequence of the perenlal deficit In United States
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International payments accounts.

In 1963, that defioit still

persisted and not reducing substantially.

In the first six

months of I960, it reached an annual rate of #3.5
billion,
80
excluding government transactions. Outflows of short-term
capital had been contributing materially to the I963 deficit.
As such, the Kennedy Administration planned an intensive
attack on the balance of payments deficit.

The first maneuver

was to use monetary policy to reduce the outflow of short
term funds from the United States.

The second part of the

assault was designed to reduce defense spending overseas, to
demand greater insistence on lowering European trade barriers
against the United States, and to renew the drive for tax
cuts to improve the competitive position of United States
industry and to attract foreign capital.®^
The Fed, in its part of the battle, wanted to use a mech
anism which would signal its determination to do something
about the present capital outflow.
rate was to be increased by 1/2#.

As such, the discount
Although there was a possib

ility for the discount rate to push long-term rates up, the
administration viewed that this wouldn't happen.
used was that because

The rational

the supply of funds available through

80Federal Reserve Bulletin. XLIX (August, 1963), p. IO63.
®^"Stage Set for Boost in Fed Discount Rate," Business
Week. (July 13, 1963), p. 112.
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long-term Investments couldn't be pushed up, or so It was
believed, because of the strong economy, and the belief that
the use of monetary policy for balance of payment reasons
QO
wouldn't slow the economy down. The goal was also to increase
the discount rate without increasing the prime rate, which
had been at 4 1/2# since August, I960, the last discount rate
change•
The discount rate increase which followed was one of
the few which wasn't directed solely and directly for align
ment with market interest rates.

The discount rat^ then,

rose from 3# to 3 1/2# during July 17-26,

Three month Treasury

bills were 3.22# on the week ending July 13, and they climbed
steadily for the remainder of the year meeting the new discount
rate by November.

In conjunction with the discount rate move,

the Federal Reserve Board revised Regulation Q by increasing
to 4#, effective July 17, 1963, the maximum rate of interest
member banks were permitted to pay on time deposits and certQ?
ificates with maturities of 90 days to one year. The combined
monetary action, then, was to help reduce short-term capital
outflows by firming United States short-term money market rates
and to permit member banks to compete more effectively fôr
funds, both foreign and domestic, available for investment.

Federal Reserve Bulletin. XLIX (July, 1963), p. 946.
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This action, aimed at helping cease a potential drain on
United States monetary reserves associated with persistent
deficit in balance of payments, did not constitute a major
change in Fed policy.

It was a directed use of monetary

control mechanisms for a specific purpose.
Congruent open market operations also were directed to
ward reducing the outflow of capital.
May and December,

Between the middle of

Fed open market operations purchased nearly

Oh
#2.3 billion of United States Government securities.

This,

in turn, produced tightness in the money market which was to
minimize the outflow of capital to foreign nations.
A combined discount rate increase and a revision of
Regulation Q was action taken by the Federal Reserve Board
to maintain the international strength of the dollar in
November, 1964.

The discount rate was increased to M-% during

November 24-30.

In addition, Regulation Q, revisions allowed

member banks to pay 4 l/2# from 4^ on time deposits over 90
days and to pay 4^ from 3 l/2^ on savings deposits held less
than one year and from 1% to 4^ for maturities of 30 to 89
days.^^The discount rate increase came in response to England's
rise November 23 of its bank rates from 5% to 7% to stop a
massive "bear" raid against the p o u n d . A c c o r d i n g to

^^Eastburn, op. cit.. pp. 94-95.
New Touch of Caution," Business Week. (November 28,
1964), p. 27.

86Ibid.

69
Chairman Martin of the Board of Governors, the Fed action
was an ’’insurance policy” against any outflows of funds from
the United States which might result from Britain’s move.^^
The rational behind the duel actions was to counter possible
capital outflows that might have been prompted by any widen
ing spread between United States interest rates and foreign
interest rates and to ensure the flow of savings to member
banks for domestic investment finance.

88

Open market operations were also used for this purpose.
In late November to December, the Fed purchased about |750
million of Government securities to ensure that the rise in
money market rates following discount rate actions would not
restrict the availability of domestic credit.
The November discount rate action produced generally
critical reactions.^^Some financial and economic circles
believed that the British dilemma was just an excuse for the
Fed to do what it was planning on anyway.

Although the

majority of the governors of the Federal Reserve had urged
for stronger policy.

Chairman Martin insisted that the move

was taken only for international reasons.
predicted an increase in the prime rate.

Some experts
This never happened,

Q'^Ibld.
Federal Reserve Bulletin. L (December, 1964), p. 1520.
^^Eastburn,

on. cit.. p. 96 .

New Touch of Caution,” op. cit.. pp. 27-28.

CHART XIII
1964
(millions)
1600

1400

M

1500

m

1200

i--

»

B

;

1

(MtM; t -

-

U ( isiiu is
t44

I

71
John Kenneth Galbraith charged that the Fed had yielded to
those who wanted higher interest rates; to please them and
not to benefit those who never had money to lend.

Other

economists saw a slackening of United States growth rate
during the middle of 1965 and felt that the discount rate
increase would lead to generally tighter money.

However, the

Fed tried to promote the idea that the discount rate didn't
necessarily mean tighter money.

It characterized the prevail

ing monetary policy as "cautious,

less easy'*, but one "essen -

tially of ease", the implication being that if the British
bank rate increase turned the sterling crisis favorable to
that country, the discount rate would drop.^^
One of the most controversial of the Fed's adjustment of
the discount rate occurred in December,

1965.

The economy was

nearing its fifty-seventh month of expansion and showing signs
of inflationary pressures.

Three month Treasury bill yields

were 4.08^ in November and 4.12^ on the week ending December
4.

Federal Funds varied around the

discount rate since

July, 1965, and were 4.10^ in November, 1965.

Certificates

of Deposit rates, first offered in May of I 962 at 2.94^, had
increased to 4.47^ in November,

I 965.

for an increase in the discount rate.

The time was right
Prior to the discount

rate increase in December, the Johnson Administration and

91 Ibid.
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and economic and financial sectors desired it to prevent
"a deteriation in the quality of credit'.', brought about by
intense bank competition for high volume at extraordinarily
small profit margins.
Considering the inflationary pressures on the economy,
Chairman Martin pressed for a discount rate increase on the
theory that the most effective time to combat inflation is
during the development stage.

As such,

the discount rate

was increased during December 6-13 to 4 \/2% from 4%, highest
in 35 years.

The increase was intended to "moderate additional

bank reliance on short-term borrowings from the Federal
Reserve to meet intensifying loan demands."^^The action pro
vided additional reserves to member banks to meet seasonal
pressures as well as the then expanding credit needs without
promoting excesses, primarily through the purchase of Govern
ment securities on the open market.^^During the DecemberJanuary transition period, open market operations aided the
reserve positions of member banks through open market purchases
aimed at softening the shock of the discount rate move.
In connection with the discount rate increase, the Fed
revised regulation Q on December 6. The revision permitted

^ Michael E. Lev)", "Increase in the Discount Rate; Timing,
Motivation, Economic Effects," Conference Board Record. Ill
(January, 1966), p. 14.

93ibld.
^ 'Discount Hike Starts to Pinch Bank Loans," Business
Week. (February 5, 1966), p. 26.
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member banks to pay 5 l/2% on time deposits over 30 days,
on 30 to 89 day time deposits and Certificates of Deposits,
and 4 1/2% on 90 days and over on time deposits and Certificates
of Deposits.

The intention of the revision was to attract

and retain deposits and to make effective use of savings
funds already available in the economy to finance their loan
expansion .95
The combined action of the discount rate increase and the
Regulation Q revision was hoped to have a three-pronged impact.
First, it was to help prevent inflationary excesses in develop
ing in an economy carrying the added expense of the Viet Nam
war.

Secondly,

it was to aid the Government's program to

overcome a persistent deficit in the United States balance of
payments, running at an annual rate of #1.85 billion,during the
first three quarters of 1965.

Thirdly,

it was to again demon

strate the determination to maintain the international strength
of the dollar.9G
The Federal Reserve Board's action on the discount rate
was heavily criticized.

The move was considered an "open

declaration of independence by the Federal Reserve Board
against the Administration"9^ince the discount rate was

95"Federal Reserve Policy Actions," Federal Reserve
Bulletin, LI (December, I 965 ), p. I 667 .

9^Ibid., pp. I668-I676.
97Levy, pp. cit., p. 14.
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adjusted without the Administration’s knowledge.

Since the

Administration was against higher interest rates,

the Fed

wasn't expected to move without express Administration auth
ority.

It was felt by many experts that the discount rate

wouldn't be raised until after the President's budget message
in January, I 966 .

However,

Chairman Martin felt that with

a vacancy in the Board coming up in January, the liklihood
of making any future restraint would be more difficult with
a nomination which would change the balance of power of the
Board.

As it was, the rate change was approved by a 4-3 vote,

with Governor Baderston, whose term was expiring January 31,
voting with the majority.^^Also, if the Board waited until
mid-January to change the discount rate, no time for favorable
Fed action would be due to the budget announcement.

An out

come of the discount rate, which enraged some experts, was the
increase of the prime rate.

The move was conducted December

6 raising the prime rate to 5% from 4 1/2% set in August, i 960 ,
and originated with the First National Bank of Chicago.^9
Investment men were worried by, the discount rate increase
since, historically,

a rise leads to a peak in the stock

market.^^As such, the stock market registered the highest
opening volume since 1929 and hasn't recovered fully since.

9 Ibid.
99"Taklng Rise in Stride," Business Week. (December 11,
1965).,,p. 25.
l00"Feij Holds Key To Action," Business Week. (December 11,
1965), p. 141.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The importance of the discount rate as a counter-cyclical
weapon has varied since the passage of the Federal Reserve
Act*

The rise of the open market operation as a

monetary

tool for stabilizing a prevailing policy has minimized the
use of discount rates.

Although the discount window was used

somewhat during the 1920's, it was little used from 1934 through
1952.

During most of the 1930's, member banks never readily

used the discount window due to the large excesses of reserves.
Thus, the mechanism had a standby significance.

During World

War II, and until early 1951, member banks found it more
advantageous to dispose of United States Government securities
for replenishment of reserves rather than to utilize the dis
count window.

These securities, of which member banks had

large amounts due to Federal Reserve financial committment
of the war, were supported by the Fed.

After the Treasury-

Federal Reserve Accord of 1951, the support policy was dis
continued leaving the securities in the hands of supply and
demand forces.
It was not until after the Accord that the discount rate
assumed real importance.

Since the Accord removed Fed support

of Government securities, yields were free to rise.

Thus,

when yields rose above the discount rate, the discount window
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became an attractive source of reserve funds because of the
lower cost to the member bank.

The time was right for the

use of the discount rate as an integral part of counter
cyclical monetary policy, but no need arose for it.
Fed did turn to discount policy,

When the

it caused a reluctance for

member banks to borrow with discount rate increases which
goes along with an ingrained attitude against going into debt.
As such, the member banks sold open-market assets and tightened
loan policy to avoid borrowing from the Reserve banks, as in

1954 .

When the Fed forced member banks to borrow in 1953 and

1955 , the only effect it had was to cause uncertainty as to
the use of the mechanism and as to the effect on the business
community.
After the Federal Reserve Board revised Regulation A of
the Federal Reserve Act in 1955, the importance of the discount
rate as a counter-cyclical mechanism was re-established.

Al

though the revision more-or-less Just restated the original
Regulation, the implication was that the Fed condoned and
promoted the use of the discount window

by member banks to

meet reserve stringencies, its prime purpose.

It reasserted

that the use of the discount window was a privilege, not a
right, of Federal Reserve System membership.
The Federal Reserve Board's rational behind discount
rate changes has been varied.
rate changes were;

The majority of the discount

(1) to align the discount rate closer to

78
short-term market rates of interest, three month Treasury bills
in particular, and (2) to eliminate the discount rate as a
deterrent to member bank borrowing by lowering it
make borrowing more expensive by raising it.

or to

Discount rate

changes tend to lag behind these market rates.

Market rates

could be undergoing a transition period and would, thus, be
expected to fall, as they did in late 1959 and early I960.
Here market rates were above the 4^ discount rate for four
months.

The Fed allowed the rates to ride themselves out

since the economy was at a cyclical plateau.

The discount

rate actually becomes the anchor around which other rates
generally float.

This is an important consideration when the

Fed changes it.
The first use of the discount rate as a signal of mo n e
tary policy was during 1956.

The signal aspect of the dis

count rate is the major significance of it.

As such, with

the raising of the discount rate, the Fed signals to the
public, business community, and financial and economic inter
ests the credit policy which will be either tightening or
will soon be tightened.

And, with the lowering of the dis

count.rate, greater ease is likely to be the policy. There
fore,

since member banlcs had resorted to borrowing on a scale

large enough to allow the discount rate to be influential as
a counter-cyclical tool, the Fed used the 1956 discount rate
increases to signal a tightening monetary and credit policy.

19
Although the Fed has adjusted the discount rate to he
consistent with the economic and monetary conditions of the
time, there have been instances of untiraelyness.

in 1957,

three month Treasury bills as well as other other short
term rates were averaging above the prevailing 3.0^ discount
rate for eight.months.

Just after the discount rate adjust

ment, the economy had a down-turn which could be partially
to blame on the Fed since it h a d n ’t acted when it should have,
thus causing superfluous ideas about the economy.

However,

the discount rate adjustments during 1958, 1959, and i 960
could be considered timely and routine,

aligning it with

short-term market rates and signalling a restrictive or easy
monetary and credit policy.
The discount rate changes in the 1 9 6 0 ’s expansion were
directed toward international considerations.

Here, rate

adjustments were keeping the rate in line with short-term
market rates so as to aid in retaining capital in the United
States by tightening the short-term market.

As such, it was

used to better the balance of payments position and to uphold
the international strength of the dollar.
The real role of the discount rate is to signal a change
in credit policy so that open market operations and reserve
requirement adjustments can affect the reserve position of
member banks, more heavily.

As such, the actual change in

the credit conditions is due to the open market operations.

80
With each discount rate change,

open market operations are

conducted to supplement the move.

Ifhen the discount rate is

increased to tighten the money market, open market operations
sell Government securities, thus sopping up excess reserves.
Open market operations purchase securities when the discount
rate is reduced to aid in the easing monetary policy.
At times, reserve requirements are adjusted as a supple
mentary action to discount rate changes.

In I963 , in order to

more effectively combat a balance of payments deficit result
ing from the movement of short-term capital from this country,
reserve requirements were lowered in conjunction with a discount
rate increase.

The move further supported the discount rate's

purpose and allowed member banks to compete more effectively
for domestic and foreign funds.
The Federal Reserve Board's use of the discount rate,
then, is primarily that of a signal of intentions in regard
to the monetary and credit policy the Board has at its dis
posal,

The discount rate's role is largely psychological,

using open-market operations as a back-up.

The rationale

behind a Federal Reserve discount rate change is dependent
upon general and specific economic and financial conditions,
but is mainly used as an anchor rate around which short-term
market interest rates usually float.
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